Social Choice and Welfare

Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings. Algaba E., Moretti S., Rémila E., Solal P.

Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings.
Social Choice and Welfare, (2021) 57:817-849.
Algaba E., Moretti S., Rémila E., Solal P.

Abstract:
In many real world situations, the design of social rankings over agents or items
from a given raking over groups or coalitions, to which these agents or items belong
to, is of big interest. With this aim, we revise the lexicographic excellence solution
and introduce two novel solutions which, moreover, take into account the size of
the groups. We present some desirable axioms which are interpreted in this context.
Next, a comparable axiomatization of these three solutions is established, revealing
the main differences among the two new social rankings and the lexicographic excellence
solution. Finally, we apply the three social rankings under study to a real scenario.
Specifically, the performance of some football players of Paris Saint-Germain
during the UEFA Champions League according to these three rules is analyzed.

ORIGINAL PAPER

Retrouvez toutes les publications des enseignants·es-chercheurs·ses de Saint-Etienne School of Economics (SE²) sur le site du GATE Lyon / St-Etienne (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique)