Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Restricted Communication and A Priori Unions Based on the Myerson Value and the Average Tree Solution. Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal

Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Restricted Communication and A Priori Unions Based on the Myerson Value and the Average Tree Solution.
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4
Béal S., and Rémila E., Solal P.


Abstract:
We consider cooperatives games (TU-games) enriched by a system of a priori unions and a communication forest graph which are independent from each other. These two structures reflect the limitations of cooperation possibilities. In this framework, we introduce four Owen-type allocation rules, which are defined by a two-step application of an allocation rule à la Owen (in: Henn R, Moeschlin O (eds) Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, 1977) to TU-games with a priori unions where the TU-game is replaced by Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 2:225–229, 1977) graph-restricted TU-game. The four possibilities arise by applying, at each step, either the Myerson value (Myerson 1977) or the average tree solution (Herings et al. in Games Econ Behav 62:77–92, 2008). Our main result offers comparable axiomatizations of these four allocation rules.

Retrouvez toutes les publications des enseignants·es-chercheurs·ses de Saint-Etienne School of Economics (SE²) sur le site du GATE Lyon / St-Etienne (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique)