An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: A geometric approachSusumu Cato, Stéphane Gonzalez, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal
Auteurs : Susumu Cato, Stéphane Gonzalez, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal
Revue : Social Choice and Welfare, (accepted)
Abstract : This paper considers an electoral system in which voters may approve any subset of options. We introduce the class of proportional threshold methods that select the subset of options whose share of approvals in the population meets or exceeds a certain threshold. We provide an axiomatic characterization of these methods using a principle of consistency between populations and profiles of approval voting ballots. A distinctive feature of our approach is to provide a geometric proof of this characterization result.
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