Publications

Nos dernières publications

    • Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem

      Authors : Kevin Techer
      Abstract : We consider a class of social cost problems in which one polluter interacts with an arbitrary number of potential victims. Agents are supposed to cooperate and negotiate...

      Lire la suite

    • A new approach to agglomeration problems

      Authors : Adriana Navarro-Ramos
      Abstract : In this paper, we study a location problem with positive externalities. We define a new transferable utility game, considering there is no restriction on the...

      Lire la suite

    • Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies

      Authors : Gustavo Bergantiños and Adriana Navarro-Ramos
      Abstract : This paper considers agglomeration economies. A new firm is planning to open a plant in a country divided into several regions. Each firm...

      Lire la suite

    • Objective rationality and recursive multiple priors

      Title : Objective rationality and recursive multiple priors

      Authors : Federica Ceron (GATE L-SE, UJM) and Vassili Vergopoulos (Univ. Paris 2)
      Abstract :
      We provide an axiomatic characterization of recursive...

      Lire la suite

    • Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings Based on Individual and Collective Performances.

      Title : Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings Based on Individual and Collective Performances.

      Authors : Béal S., Rémila E., Solal P.
      Abstract : A coalitional ranking describes a situation where...

      Lire la suite

    • Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective

      Title : Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective

      Authors : Stéphane Gonzalez and Fatma Zahra Rostom
      Abstract :
      The article explores...

      Lire la suite

    • Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form

      Title : Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form
      Authors : Stéphane Gonzalez and Aymeric Lardon
      Abstract :
      We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness...

      Lire la suite

    • Approval voting without ballot restrictions

      Title : Approval voting without ballot restrictions
      Authors : Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez
      Abstract :
      We axiomatically study voting rules without making any assumption on the ballots that voters...

      Lire la suite

    • Another brick in the wall. Immigration and electoral preferences: Direct evidence from state ballots

      Title : Another brick in the wall. Immigration and electoral preferences: Direct evidence from state ballots
      Authors : Olivier Bargain, Victor Stephane, Jérôme Valette
      Abstract :
      We study the impact of immigration...

      Lire la suite

    • Productive Workfare? Evidence from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program

      Productive Workfare? Evidence from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program
      GATE WP 2037 – December 2020
      Jules Gazeaud, NOVA School of Business and Economics
      Victor Stéphane, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie...

      Lire la suite

    • Cohesive Efficiency in TU-games: Axiomatizations of Variants of the Shapley Value, Egalitarian values and their Convex Combinations.

      Cohesive Efficiency in TU-games: Axiomatizations of Variants of the Shapley Value, Egalitarian values and their Convex Combinations.
      Annals of Operations Research, (2021) 302: 23-47.
      Béal S., Casajus...

      Lire la suite

    • Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings.

      Lexicographic Solutions for Coalitional Rankings.
      Social Choice and Welfare, (2021) 57:817-849.
      Algaba E., Moretti S., Rémila E., Solal P.
      Abstract:
      In many real world situations, the design of social...

      Lire la suite

    • INFLUENCE: A Partizan Scoring Game on Graphs.

      INFLUENCE: A Partizan Scoring Game on Graphs.
      Theoretical Computer Science, (2021) 878-879: 26-46.
      Duchêne E., Gonzalez S., Parreau A., Rémila E., Solal P.
      Abstract:
      We introduce the game influence, a...

      Lire la suite

    • The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure.

      The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure.
      International Journal of Game Theory, (2021),  https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00799-5
      Béal S., and Ferrières S., Solal P.

      Abstract...

      Lire la suite

    • Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Restricted Communication and A Priori Unions Based on the Myerson Value and the Average Tree Solution.

      Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Restricted Communication and A Priori Unions Based on the Myerson Value and the Average Tree Solution.
      Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, (2021), https...

      Lire la suite

    • AUTRES PUBLICATIONS

      Retrouvez toutes les publications des enseignants·es-chercheurs·ses de Saint-Etienne School of Economics (SE²) sur le site du GATE Lyon / St-Etienne (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique)

      Lire la suite

    • APPROCHE CONTREFACTUELLE DE LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE DES CLUSTERS

      Résumé :
      Les politiques de clusters suscitent depuis une vingtaine d'années un intérêt croissant et font l'objet d'adaptations à une variété de plus en plus grande de contextes et de pays.
      Selon l'Observatoire...

      Lire la suite

    • THÉORIE DU BIEN-ÊTRE, ACTION PUBLIQUE ET VALEURS ÉTHIQUES

      Résumé :
      Cette histoire novatrice de l'économie du bien-être remet en question l'idée reçue selon laquelle l'économie du bien-être s'est développée sans tenir compte des valeurs éthiques. Quels que soient...

      Lire la suite

    • MÉTHODE DE VOTE PAR APPROBATION (POPULATION INFINIE DÉNOMBRABLE)

      Résumé :
      Cet article étudie la méthode de vote par approbation. Chaque électeur dépose un bulletin qui contient l'ensemble des candidats/projets/options, choisi parmi une liste finie de candidats/projets/options...

      Lire la suite