Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value for multi-choice gamesSylvain Béal, Adriana Navarro-Ramos, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal
Auteurs : Sylvain Béal · Adriana Navarro-Ramos · Eric Rémila · Philippe Solal
Revue: Annals of Operations Research, 345: 59-103
Abstract : We consider the cost sharing issue resulting from the maintenance of a hazardous waste transportation network represented by a sink tree. The participating agents are located on the nodes of the network and must transport their waste to the sink through costly network portions. We introduce the Liability rule, which is inspired by the principles applied by the courts to settle cost-allocation disputes in the context of hazardous waste. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule. Furthermore, we show that the Liability rule coincides with the Priority Shapley value, a new value on an appropriate domain of multi-choice games arising from hazardous waste transportation problems. Finally, we also axiomatize the Priority Shapley value on the full domain of multi-choice games.
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