Cohesive Efficiency in TU-games: Axiomatizations of Variants of the Shapley Value, Egalitarian values and their Convex Combinations. Béal S., Casajus A., Rémila E., Solal P.

Cohesive Efficiency in TU-games: Axiomatizations of Variants of the Shapley Value, Egalitarian values and their Convex Combinations.
Annals of Operations Research, (2021) 302: 23-47.
Béal S., Casajus A., Rémila E., Solal P.

Abstract:
We relax the assumption that the grand coalition must form by imposing the axiom of Cohesive
efficiency: the total payoffs that the players can share is equal to the maximal total worth
generated by a coalition structure. We determine how the three main axiomatic characterizations
of the Shapley value are affected when the classical axiom of Efficiency is replaced
by Cohesive efficiency.We introduce and characterize two variants of the Shapley value that
are compatible with Cohesive efficiency. We show that our approach can also be applied to
the variants of more egalitarian values.

Article

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