Seminar GATE-LSE Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University)

▶️ Tuesday April 30, 10h30-11h45
▶️ Venue : Tréfilerie Campus; Michelet Building; Room 202
▶️ Speaker : Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University)
▶️ Title : "Seemingly Informative Matching Mechanisms"

▶️ Abstract : 
🔸 We consider a model where market participants can observe the identity of the agents they can be matched with but not their types.
🔸 A mechanism generates a matching and an announcement at each reported type profile.
🔸 For the case of one-sided incomplete information, we fully characterize the set of matching states which are both minimally informative and stable, and show that not every assortative matching mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible.
🔸 Our main result states that every seemingly informative assortative matching mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible.
🔸 Such mechanisms become manipulable when incompleteness of information applies to both sides of the market.

More information :
ℹ  www.gate.cnrs.fr
ℹ  https://se2.univ-st-etienne.fr
ℹ  se2 @ univ-st-etienne.fr (se2 @ univ-st-etienne.fr)